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THE COMPACT CLAUSE AND
TRANSBOUNDARY PROBLEMS: "A FEDERAL
REMEDY FOR THE DISEASE MOST INCIDENT
TO A FEDERAL GOVERNMENT"'
By
DALE D. GOBLE*
There where it is we do not need the wall:
He is all pine and I am apple orchard.
My apple trees will never get across
And eat the cones under his pines, I tell him.
He only says, "Good fences make good neighbors."
-Robert Frost'
The political and constitutional relationship that is known as
"federalism" creates boundaries that often do not correspond to
resources. The anadromous salmon and steelhead of the Columbia
River Basin, for example, cross several jurisdictional boundaries
during their life cycle. Jurisdictional boundaries frequently con-
tribute to poor resource planning because some actors are
excluded.
One traditional response to such transboundary resource dif-
ficulties has been to nationalize the problem, thus creating a fo-
rum in which all of the actors may participate. Nationalization,
however, may be overinclusive when the problem is regional. An
alternative that is potentially more sensitive to local concerns is
found in the compact clause of the Constitution. This clause al-
lows states and the national government to reallocate authority to
* Associate Professor, University of Idaho College of Law. J.D. 1978,
University of Oregon; A.B. 1975, Columbia College. The research for this Article
was partially funded by the University of Idaho College of Law Summer Research
Grant Program. Bowen Blair, Mike Salsgiver, and John Volkman took time to
help me search for documents or to read earlier drafts of the manuscript; their
assistance is gratefully acknowledged.
1. With apologies to Publius, who argued in The Federalist No. 10 that a
geographically extensive republic would reduce the likelihood that any faction
would be able to obtain a majority and thus was "a Republican remedy for the
diseases most incident to Republican Government." THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 65
(J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) [all subsequent citations to specific pages will be
to this edition].
2. R. Frost, Mending Wall, in THE POETRY OF ROBERT FROST 33 (E. Lathem
ed. 1969).
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address regional issues.
Two recent federal statutes have adopted the compact clause
mechanism in response to Pacific Northwest resource allocation
problems. This Article examines the Pacific Northwest Electric
Power Planning and Conservation Act and the Columbia River
Gorge National Scenic Area Act as examples of a regional re-
sponse to transboundary resource problems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Fences may indeed make good neighbors, but the limitation
of responsibility that a fence creates can produce a myopia. This
shortsightedness often contributes to poor resource decision mak-
ing because our fences seldom correspond to natural divisions.'
Air, water, and wildlife cross our artificial boundaries in response
to gravity, wind, rain, or biology. The intricate jurisdictional
boundaries that fence the Columbia River Basin, for example, are
a major cause of the decimation of the River's anadromous fish."
When concern ends at the nearest fence, the connectedness of
things is lost; lines on paper become walls and decisions lack vi-
sion.' Federalism, with its symbolic fences, encourages such trans-
3. Cf. Smith, What are the Metes and Bounds of a Wave, 4 OCEAN DEV. &
INT'L L. 369 (1977) (arguing against the extension of "land-oriented system[s]" to
a "fluid medium").
4. During its life, a spring chinook salmon spawned in the Salmon River of
Idaho will be subject to at least seventeen distinct jurisdictions. See Goble, Intro-
duction to the Symposium on Legal Structures for Managing the Pacific North-
west Salmon and Steelhead: The Biological and Historical Context, 22 IDAHo L.
REV. 417, 419 n.5 (1986). The result has been conflict and the near-loss of a seem-
ingly inexhaustible resource. See generally Bodi, Protecting Columbia River
Salmon under the Endangered Species Act, 10 ENVTL. L. 349 (1980); Wilkinson &
Conner, The Law of the Pacific Salmon Fishery: Conservation and Allocation of
a Transboundary Common Property Resource, 32 U. KAN. L. REV. 17 (1983).
5. As George Coggins pithily put it: "Grizzly bears don't stop at customs."
Coggins, Grizzly Bears Don't Stop at Customs: A Preface to Transboundary
Problems in Natural Resources Law, 32 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (1983). See generally
Symposium on Transboundary Problems in Natural Resources Law, id. Our sym-
bolic fences create problems even with relatively stationary resources. A decision
by the federal government to sell coal leases in the face of state opposition is but
another example of boundaries contributing to resource conflicts. See generally
Babbitt, Federalism and the Environment: An Intergovernmental Perspective of
the Sagebrush Rebellion, 12 ENVTL. L. 847 (1982); Wilkinson, Cross-Jurisdictional
Conflicts: An Analysis of Legitimate State Interests on Federal and Indian
Lands, 2 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 145 (1982).
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boundary problems. Indeed, the myopia produced by our jurisdic-
tional fences is "the disease most incident to federalism."
Two symptoms of this disease are particularly common in re-
source decision making.' The first is the spillover effect. Because
of their geographically limited political responsibility, states are
unlikely to restrict the conduct of their citizens to benefit the citi-
zens of another state. Out-of-state individuals cannot make their
preferences known through the local political market. Oregon and
Washington, for example, have no incentive to limit salmon fish-
ing in the Columbia River so that fishers in Idaho can harvest
part of the run because Idaho fishers do not vote in Oregon or
Washington.
The second symptom also has an economic analogue: the
Tragedy of the Commons.' Local decision making encourages
each state to avoid actions that might create competitive disad-
vantages. Oregon and Washington have no incentive to limit the
salmon fishing of their citizens unless the other state also does,
because one state's action would merely leave more salmon for
the other state's fishers.
A principal response to these symptoms of myopia is to re-
move the fences by nationalizing the transboundary problem: uni-
form national standards can reduce spillovers and blunt inter-
state competition in lax enforcement.' The national perspective is
an integrative force that can internalize the externalities and pro-
vide uniform regulation for the commons; a geographically larger
group of individuals can make their preferences known in the
6. See, e.g., Leman & Nelson, The Rise of Managerial Federalism: An As-
sessment of Benefits and Costs, 12 ENVTL. L. 981, 998-1000 (1982); Stewart, Pyra-
mids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation
of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1211-12, 1215-16 (1977).
7. Each rancher has an incentive to put another cow on the open range be-
cause the benefit of the cow accrues to the rancher while the disadvantage is
shared by all grazers; besides, the grass will otherwise be eaten by someone else's
cow. The result, of course, is that the range is destroyed and the cows starve. The
classic statement of the theory is in Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162
SCIENCE 1243 (1968). I have elsewhere argued that the problem would more accu-
rately be labeled (another) Tragedy of the Market. See Goble, supra note 4, at 418
n.4.
8. But see Squillace, Cooperative Federalism under the Surface Mining Con-
trol and Reclamation Act: Is This Any Way to Run a Government?, 87 W. VA. L.
REV. 687 (1985).
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more encompassing national political marketplace.
Although nationalization has been the most common re-
sponse, it has its limits; not all transboundary problems are of a
national size.' The difficulties facing the Columbia River's salmon
and steelhead, for example, are largely regional, traceable primar-
ily to the unique degree of hydroelectric development in the Ba-
sin."0 The problems on the Columbia differ thus from those on
the Sacramento," which differ in turn from the problems on the
Klamath." In the face of such diversity, a uniform federal rule
would necessarily be a very blunt instrument. At the same time,
however, these river systems involve more than a single sovereign,
and the resulting jurisdictional fences are part of the problem. A
regional remedy for myopia is needed, and the Constitution offers
one-the interstate compact clause.' s
The compact clause provides a formal mechanism for states
to remove the fences between themselves and create an area of
interstate uniformity that reduces the jurisdictional component of
a transboundary problem. A compact creates this area of uni-
9. It should also be noted that nationalization does not reach the interna-
tional transboundary problems. Chinook salmon from Idaho's Salmon River, for
example, must pass through Canadian territorial waters on their return trip from
their feeding grounds in the Gulf of Alaska and elude Canadian fishers. The same
disincentives to conserve resources are also applicable to the fences between Ca-
nada and the United States. See Goble, supra note 4, at 459-61; Jensen, The
United States-Canada Pacific Salmon Interception Treaty: An Historical and
Legal Overview, 16 ENVT. L. 363 (1986).
10. See generally Blumm, Hydropower vs. Salmon: The Struggle of the Pa-
cific Northwest's Anadromous Fish Resources for a Peaceful Coexistence with the
Federal Columbia River Power System, 11 ENVTL. L. 211, 220-22 (1981); Goble,
supra note 4, at 431-41.
11. The National Marine Fisheries Service recently considered listing the
Sacramento River Basin's winter-run chinook population as an endangered spe-
cies. The primary cause of the run's decline was an irrigation diversion dam with
insufficient fish-passage facilities that prevented some of the run from reaching
suitable spawning habitat above the diversion dam. See Notice on Winter Run
Chinook Salmon, 52 Fed. Reg. 6,041 (1987).
12. The Klamath runs are allegedly threatened by timber harvesting and road
building activities which would increase sedimentation in spawning areas. See
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586 (N.D.
Cal. 1983), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 764 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1985), on reh'g,
796 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. granted 107 S. Ct. 1971 (1986).
13. The clause provides: "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress,
... enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State." U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 10, cl. 3.
[Vol. 17:785
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formity in two ways. First, the process of political adjustment re-
quired to negotiate a compact allows the parties to specify deci-
sion making procedures and standards; in effect, to adopt a
uniform law applicable to the particular problem. Oregon and
Washington, for example, have established uniform regulations
for harvesting the salmon runs in the Columbia Basin through the
Columbia River Fish Compact." In addition, the formalization of
the compact ensures that these standards and procedures will be
uniformly interpreted: "[C]ongressional consent transforms an in-
terstate compact . . . into a law of the United States" and inter-
pretation of its terms is, therefore, a federal question for the fed-
eral courts.15 An interstate compact thus creates interstate
14. Act of Apr. 8, 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-123, 40 Stat. 515. This compact also
highlights the two principal shortcomings of resolving transboundary resource
problems through interstate compacts. First, they require a symmetry of interests
among the compacting states that may not always be present. Since compacts
must be negotiated, a state creating spillovers will often have little incentive to
agree to restrict its flexibility. The history of the Columbia River Fish Compact is
illustrative of the problem. Under the terms of their admission acts, Oregon and
Washington have concurrent jurisdiction over the Columbia River where it forms
their common boundary. A 1909 Supreme Court decision reversing an Oregon con-
viction of two Washington residents for violations of the more restrictive Oregon
fisheries laws provided additional incentives for joint regulation of the fishery in
the River because neither state could effectively regulate without the concurrence
of the other. The two states negotiated a compact in 1915; Congress approved it in
1918. See Nielsen v. Oregon, 212 U.S. 315 (1909); Wollenberg, The Columbia
River Fish Compact, 18 OR. L. Riv. 88, 92-97 (1939). Idaho's frequent request for
admission to the compact, on the other hand, has been consistently rejected by
the downstream states. Under the compact, Oregon and Washington were able to
allocate the fish that spawn in Idaho without Idaho's participation. There is little
incentive to alter the system because the effects are asymmetrical. See generally
Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017, 1022 (1983); Goble, supra note 4, at
464-66.
The second limitation is the time required. One review found that water re-
sources control compacts require an average of eight years to negotiate, with an-
other five years needed for congressional approval. Interstate Agreements for Air
Pollution Control, 1968 WASH. U.L.Q. 260, 264.
15. Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438 (1981); West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v.
Sims, 341 U.S. 22 (1951). The uneven development of this conclusion is traced in
Goble, The Council and the Constitution: An Article on the Constitutionality of
the Northwest Power Planning Council, 1 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIGATION 11, 51 n.164
(1986). A compact thus overcomes a major limitation of less formal methods of
interstate cooperation, the lack of binding dispute resolution.
The fact that interpretation of the terms of the compact is a federal question
does not transform the compact agency into a national instrumentality. The belief
that all agencies exercising political power must be classifiable as either state or
19871
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consistency through an almost-constitutional redistribution of po-
litical power among the compacting parties.'"
In many situations such state-to-state political adjustments
will provide the needed degree of uniformity; the compact agency
can address the resource problems that the compact members in-
dividually could not.1 7 In some situations, however, interstate
consistency is insufficient because the national government also
has a stake in the problem. Many of the problems facing the Co-
lumbia's salmon runs, for example, are traceable to the Basin's
federal hydroelectric projects. Restoring the runs therefore re-
quires a more complex accommodation of governmental interests.
In some cases, Congress has required a federal representative to
be included on the compact agency to ensure that the national
interest is considered in the agency's decision making;"8 in others,
Congress has provided a limited waiver of federal supremacy so
that the agency can effect the needed uniformity. In both cases,
the goal has been to limit the consequences of fences on decision
making by integrating the relevant interests.
Two federal resource-management statutes addressing trans-
boundary resources in the Pacific Northwest are examples of such
federal-state compacts. The first, the Pacific Northwest Electric
national lay at the root of the challenge to the constitutionality of the Northwest
Power Planning Council. A compact agency, however, does not fit the traditional
binary division of political power because it has both national and state attributes.
E.g., Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391,
399 (1979). This neither-state-nor-national character provides the constitutional
flexibility to create novel political institutions to address more-than-state-but-
less-than-national problems.
16. E.g., West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22 (1951). Although it
limits state discretion, a compact does not reduce congressional power,
"[o]therwise Congress and two States would possess the power to modify and alter
the Constitution itself." Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S.
(18 How.) 421, 433 (1856).
17. This potential to enhance the power of individual states vis-A-vis the na-
tional government is the basis of the requirement of congressional approval. See
United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 471 (1978);
Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 518 (1893).
18. See, e.g., Delaware River Basin Compact, §§ 2.1, .2, .5, 5.4, 75 Stat. 691
(1961); see generally Grad, Federal-State Compact: A New Experiment in Co-
Operative Federalism, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 825 (1963). But see McKinley, The
Management of Water Resources under the American Federal System, in FEDER-
ALISM 328, 334-37 (A. Macmahon ed. 1955).
[Vol. 17:785
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Power Planning and Conservation Act [hereinafter PNEPPCA],"'
authorized a regional, state-appointed agency to oversee the man-
agement of the Federal Columbia River Power System.2" The sec-
ond, the Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area Act (Gorge
Act),"1 established a bi-state agency to develop a comprehensive
land use plan to protect the scenic and recreational values in the
Columbia River Gorge.22 Both statutes set out the terms of an
interstate agreement, providing detailed decision making proce-
dures and standards for the compact agency; both statutes explic-
itly confer jurisdiction on the federal courts to resolve disputes
concerning compact provisions. In addition, because the federal
government is a major property owner of the resources involved,
Congress has provided a limited waiver of federal supremacy.
Thus, both statutes provide congressional approval of regional
regulation of resource problems caused in part by the jurisdic-
tional fences that are the defining characteristic of the American
federal system. Such agreements among the states and the federal
government are "a Federal remedy for the diseases most incident
to a Federal Government."
This federal solution, however, has been challenged as con-
trary to the federal structure. The executive branch of the na-
tional government has questioned the constitutionality of the lim-
ited congressional waiver of federal supremacy, arguing that it
impermissibly subjects federal officers to the control of state ap-
pointees. The validity of this challenge is the subject of this brief
Article. A review of the two statutes and the waivers of
supremacy that they contain will provide the necessary back-
ground to a discussion of the constitutional question.
19. Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act, 16
U.S.C. §§ 839-839h (1982) [hereinafter PNEPPCA].
20. PNEPPCA was enacted to prevent a pending regional battle over the al-
location of inexpensive hydroelectricity generated by federally-owned dams on the
Columbia River. See generally Balmer, From Symbiosis to Synergy: A Case
Study of Public and Private Power in the Pacific Northwest, 13 ENVTL. L. 637
(1983); Blumm, The Northwest's Hydroelectric Heritage: Prologue to the Pacific
Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act, 58 WASH. L. REv. 175
(1983); Goble, supra note 15, at 16-18.
21. Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area Act, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 544-544h
(West Supp. 1987) [hereinafter Gorge Act].
22. See id. § 3, 16 U.S.C.A. § 544a (statement of purposes).
19871
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II. THE STATUTES: ADJUSTING THE STATE AND FEDERAL RULES
A. The Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and
Conservation Act
The water which eventually becomes the Columbia River
falls as rain and snow on seven states (Idaho, Montana, Nevada,
Oregon, Utah, Wyoming, and Washington) and one foreign coun-
try (Canada). The major rivers which channel that water into the
Columbia-the Snake, the Clearwater and the Salmon of Idaho;
the Deschutes, the Willamette, and the John Day of Oregon; and
the Yakima, the Spokane, and the Pend Oreille of Washing-
ton-share two relevant features. Each has been extensively
dammed to generate hydroelectricity; there are now almost 130
hydroelectric or multipurpose dams in the Basin.2" Each river also
shares the Basin's almost-lost heritage as home to the world's
largest salmon and steelhead runs. These two facts are related be-
cause the operation of the Basin's rivers to maximize electricity
production was a principal cause of the decline of the runs.24
The relationship between fish and power in the Columbia
River Basin is a classical transboundary problem requiring coor-
dination of the four principal states (Idaho, Montana, Oregon,
and Washington) as well as the federal government. The neces-
sary coordination was formalized when the states and the federal
government reached the agreement contained in the Northwest
Power Act (PNEPPCA). 25
PNEPPCA has three primary components. First, it reallo-
cated the low-cost hydroelectricity generated by the federally-
owned dams on the Columbia River.2 Second, it increased the
23. Goble, supra note 4, at 431-32.
24. See Blumm, supra note 10, at 220-22; Goble, supra note 4, at 435-41.
25. Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act, 16
U.S.C. §§ 839-839h (1986) [hereinafter PNEPPCA].
26. Section 5 of the Act requires the BPA Administrator to supply electricity
to customers who previously lacked a legal entitlement. Prior to PNEPPCA,
BPA's obligation to provide electricity was restricted to the output of the Federal
Columbia River Power System hydroelectric projects and the agency's interest in
certain thermal plants. 16 U.S.C. § 832a (1982). Although the electricity produced
by the Federal Columbia River Power System was legally subject to a preference
clause, nonpreference customers had become dependent upon the federal electric-
ity. In PNEPPCA, Congress recognized this dependence and sought to prevent
the disruption that would occur when the surplus ended. It did so by establishing
[Vol. 17:785
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authority of the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) Admin-
istrator to acquire electricity.2 7 This new authority, however, was
restricted by the third major component of the Act, an interstate
compact agency.28 The Administrator's discretion was limited by
the requirement that she act consistently with two plans devel-
oped by the compact agency. 9 PNEPPCA thus sought to prevent
the region's threatened electricity shortages by increasing the Ad-
ministrator's authority to acquire additional electricity and by re-
allocating the existing supplies of federally-owned hydroelectri-
city. In addition, Congress attempted to allay fears that the
Administrator would become a regional "energy czar" by balanc-
ing the expanded federal role with an expanded state role." Con-
minimum statutory entitlements for each class of BPA customers, including cus-
tomers who previously lacked a legal entitlement. PNEPPCA § 5(g)(1). See gener-
ally Goble, supra note 15, at 19 n.28; Mellem, Darkness to Dawn? Generating and
Conserving Electricity in the Pacific Northwest: A Primer on the Northwest
Power Act, 58 WASH. L. REv. 245 (1983); Michie, Impacts of the Pacific Northwest
Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act on the Development of Energy
Resources in the Pacific Northwest: An Analysis of the Resource Acquisition Pri-
ority Scheme, 4 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 299 (1981).
27. Section 6 of the Act requires the Administrator to "acquire ... sufficient
[conserving and generating] resources . . . to meet his contractual obligations" in-
curred under § 5. PNEPPCA § 6(a)(2). The section provides the Administrator
with several alternative methods to meet her new statutory responsibilities. See
generally Goble, supra note 15, at 20 n.30.
28. The Council has eight members, two of whom are appointed by each of
the four principal states: Idaho, Montana, Oregon and Washington. PNEPPCA §
4(a)(2).
29. The first is a twenty-year regional conservation and electric power plan
(the Plan). Id. §§ 4(d)(1)-(e)(3). The Plan is to contain a schedule for implement-
ing conservation measures and developing additional generating capacity to meet
regional electric loads as well as building conservation standards. Id. § 4(e)(2). As
one of the chief sponsors of the bill noted, "[t]he regional power plan, drafted by
the regional council, will be the map of the region's future energy path." 126
CONG. REc. 27,819 (1980) (statement of Rep. Swift). The second planning docu-
ment is "a program to protect, mitigate, and enhance fish and wildlife" resources
and habitat (the Program). PNEPPCA § 4(h)(1)(A). The Program is in part in-
tended to redress the historic imbalance between power and fish in the Basin. See
generally Blumm, supra note 10; Blumm, Promising a Process for Parity: The
Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act and Anadro-
mous Fish Protection, 11 ENVTL. L. 497 (1981); Goble, supra note 4.
30. "The states feared that without a regional planning authority responsibil-
ity to the states, BPA's decisions on what new generating plants should be built
would simply overwhelm the state planning and siting process." Hemmingway,
The Northwest Power Planning Council: Its Origins and Future Role, 13 ENVTL.
L. 673, 679 (1983); see also H.R. REP. No. 976, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 78,
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gress therefore reduced the Administrator's discretion by waiving
federal supremacy to require her to act "in a manner consistent
with" the Council's plans.31 This restriction is the basis of the
challenge to the constitutionality of the Act and the Council.32
B. The Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area Act
Where the Snake River joins the Columbia, the Columbia
turns west, becoming the border between Oregon and Washing-
ton. Almost 200 miles downstream, the river meets the Cascade
Mountains where it has carved a gorge, a place of special beauty.
But, like many special places, the Gorge is threatened by its uni-
queness. The threats are compounded by the division of govern-
mental power among three sovereigns: the north side of the Gorge
is in Washington, the south in Oregon, and much of the land re-
mains in federal ownership, managed primarily by the Forest Ser-
vice. Protection thus requires the cooperation of the three
sovereigns. 3
The needed cooperation was given institutional structure and
formal procedures in the Columbia River Gorge National Scenic
Area Act.3 ' The structure consists of an interstate compact
agency, the Columbia River Gorge Commission, 3 that is responsi-
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6023, 6069. Given the pivotal
position of energy planning to state siting responsibilities, a state-appointed plan-
ning council was a necessary check on the Administrator's authority-lest she be-
come a regional "energy czar." See, e.g., 126 CONG. REC. 27,818, 27,828 (1980)
(statements of Rep. Swift); id. at 27,815 (statement of Rep. Dingell); id. at 27,812
(statement of Rep. Lujan).
31. PNEPPCA contains several provisions requiring BPA to use its statutory
authority to protect fish and wildlife "in a manner consistent with" the Plan and
the Program, PNEPPCA § 4(h)(10)(A), and requiring resource acquisition deci-
sions to be consistent with the Plan. Id. § 4(d)(2); see also id. §§ 6(a)(1), (f)(1)
(reiterating the general requirement that resources be acquired only when "consis-
tent with the plan"). The consistency requirements are set out in detail in Goble,
supra note 15, at 19-29.
32. See infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
33. As Representative Les AuCoin of Oregon commented, "Without a bi-
State commission with a Federal official involved, all the interests involved are not
going to be fully represented." 132 CONG. REC. H11,121 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1986)
(statement of Rep. AuCoin).
34. Gorge Act, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 544-555h (West Supp. 1987).
35. The Gorge Act gives congressional consent to the formation of a commis-
sion to consist of twelve state members and an ex officio representative of the
Secretary of Agriculture. Id. § 5(a), 16 U.S.C.A. § 544c(a).
[Vol. 17:785
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ble with the Secretary of Agriculture for developing a manage-
ment plan for lands within the Gorge." To implement this joint
planning responsibility, the Gorge Act establishes standards and
procedures; the process thus instituted is to culminate in a Scenic
Area Management Plan, incorporating land use designations ap-
plicable to both federal and nonfederal lands."' Subsequent land
use decisions within the Scenic Area are required to be consistent
with the Management Plan.ss
Until the Management Plan has been completed, the Secre-
tary of Agriculture may initiate proceedings to condemn private
land "which is being used or threatened to be used in a manner
inconsistent with the purposes for which the scenic area was es-
tablished."3 " This condemnation authority, however, is subject to
the veto of the Gorge Commission. This limited waiver of fed-
eral supremacy is the basis of the executive branch's attack on
the constitutionality of the Act."'
C. Some Preliminary Conclusions
Both statutes share several common features. These can be
traced to the fact that both statutes involve resource problems
where the state and federal governments have some governmental
authority over the resource but each government lacks sufficient
independent authority to address the entire problem. Both stat-
utes, in other words, embody an adjustment and redistribution of
authority among the governments involved in an attempt to re-
36. The Gorge Act applies to all federal and nonfederal lands within the
Scenic Area except that within thirteen designated "urban areas." Id. § 4(e), 16
U.S.C.A. § 544b(e).
37. The land use designations and management directions applicable to the
federal lands within the Gorge are adopted by the Secretary of Agriculture and
incorporated "without change" into the Plan. Id. § 6(c)(4), 16 U.S.C.A. §
544d(c)(4). For nonfederal lands, see generally id. § 6, 16 U.S.C.A. § 544d; see also
id. § 8(f), 16 U.S.C.A. § 544f(f).
38. Id. § 7(b), 16 U.S.C.A. § 544e(b).
39. Id. § 10(b)(1), 16 U.S.C.A. § 544h(b)(1). This authority is statutorily lim-
ited by the additional requirement that, except for laids used to mine sand,
gravel, or crushed rock, or to dispose of garbage, the land use must have changed
after the effective date of the Act. Id.
40. The Commission may by a supermajority override the Secretary's decision
to condemn lands. Id. If the Commission is not in existence, the governor of the
state in which the land is located may exercise the veto. Id.
41. See infra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
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duce the jurisdictional component of the problem. By removing
the jurisdictional fences, the problem can be addressed more
comprehensively.
To remove this federalism component of the resource prob-
lem, both statutes establish an interstate compact agency with
planning responsibilities. In addition, because the federal govern-
ment is a major resource owner, Congress has included the na-
tional interest in the adjustment of governmental powers by en-
acting a restricted waiver of federal supremacy. Both statutes
thus embody a complex balancing of the interests of the govern-
ments involved in an attempt to fashion a remedy to the myopia
inherent in federalism.
The question is whether this remedy is constitutionally
permissible.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE
The executive branch of the national government has ques-
tioned the constitutionality of both statutes, contending that
state governments cannot control decisions of the national gov-
ernment.42 In his statement prior to signing the Gorge Bill, for
example, President Reagan said:
I have grave doubts as to the constitutionality of the provision in
section 10, which would authorize the Governors of Washington
and Oregon and the State-appointed Columbia River Gorge Com-
mission to disapprove Federal condemnation actions. The Federal
government may not constitutionally be bound by such State ac-
tion taken pursuant to Federal law.4
3
42. Both PNEPPCA and the Gorge Act concern subjects over which the fed-
eral government has jurisdiction under the property clause of the Constitution;
that clause provides: "The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belong-
ing to the United States." U.S. CONST. art. IV § 3 cl. 2. PNEPPCA is based upon
federal ownership of the Columbia River dams and the electricity they generate.
See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 330-39 (1936). Similarly,
the Gorge Act is predicated on federal ownership of the National Forest lands
within the Gorge. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976); United States
v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911); United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526
(1840).
43. President's Statement upon Signing H.R. 5705 Into Law, 22 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1576 (Nov. 17, 1986). The President justified signing an uncon-
stitutional bill by announcing his interpretation of the language:
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The same argument was raised in the attack on the constitution-
ality of the Power Planning Council."
The challenge to the two statutes is predicated upon the con-
tention that they exceed federalism limits. The executive branch
argues that Congress (with the concurrence of the President)"
has impermissibly sought to restructure the fundamental rela-
tionship between the national and state governments enunciated
in the supremacy clause of the Constitution:" the states lack the
I am signing this bill with the understanding that State disapproval of a
Federal condemnation action under this legislation will not operate as a
veto, but will be merely advisory. Upon receipt of a State notice of disap-
proval, the Federal government will decide whether to proceed with its con-
demnation action.
Id. The language of § 10 is not, however, subject to the President's interpretation.
See infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
The President's statement contains no analysis, only assertion. Attempts to
obtain a more complete account of the executive branch's position have been un-
successful. A Freedom of Information Act request for the documents was denied; a
complaint is currently being drafted for filing in federal district court. There is a
troubling irony in this situation: the President states that a statute is unconstitu-
tional-for reasons that are too secret to be revealed.
44. Litigation attacking the regional conservation and power plan challenged
the constitutionality of the Council. See Seattle Master Builders Ass'n v. Pacific
Northwest Elec. Power & Conservation Planning Council, 786 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 939 (1987). Among the arguments offered by peti-
tioners was the contention that PNEPPCA violated federalism limitations by sub-
jecting the decisions of a federal agency to a state-appointed body. Petitioners'
Opening Brief at 53-55, id.; Petitioners' Reply Brief at 21-25, id. This argument
appears to be the same as that suggested by President Reagan in his statement on
signing the Gorge bill. See generally infra notes 71-84 and accompanying text.
45. There is, of course, an irony in allowing the executive branch to attack the
constitutionality of a statute that became law only with the concurrence of the
President. Furthermore, it effectively allows the President a power akin to the
item veto since he is able to accept what he likes and litigate the rest. See Miller
& Bowman, Presidential Attacks on the Constitutionality of Federal Statutes: A
New Separation of Powers Problem, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 51 (1979). This irony reaches
levels of the absurd when practiced by an administration that so stridently advo-
cates what it terms a "Jurisprudence of Original Intention." See Meese, Speech to
the American Bar Association, Washington, D.C. (July 9, 1986), reprinted as The
Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited Constitution, 27 S.
TEX. L. REv. 455, 464 (1986). On the "Original Intention" as to the veto power,
see, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 73 (A. Hamilton).
46. The clause provides that the "Constitution, and the laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
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power to control federal officers and activities. 7 States, in other
words, may not restrict the discretion of a federal officer in man-
aging federal property as long as Congress has delegated discre-
tion to the officer.' 8 The President's challenge raises the question
of the constitutionally permissible relationship between state and
national governments: does federalism limit the range of possible
political adjustments?
A. Federalism: The Spatial Division of Power
"Federalism" is an attempt to create a constitutional struc-
ture which accommodates both diversity and nondiversity-the
local and the national-through a spatial division of governmen-
tal power. In common with "confederalism," the term specifies
that two governments exercise power over the same geographical
territory; as distinguished from "confederalism," federalism speci-
fies that the central or federal government acts directly upon the
individuals within that territory rather than only upon the con-
stituent governments.' Individuals, in other words, owe political
loyalty to two sovereigns in a federal system."
Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
47. As Chief Justice Marshall commented, the prohibition is a corollary de-
duced from the supremacy clause. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
426, 433 (1819).
48. The officer's discretion is limited by the statute under which the officer
acts since it is Congress which has "Power to ...make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the ...Property belonging to the United States." U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
49. See Macmahon, The Problems of Federalism: A Survey, in FEDERALISM 3,
4-5 (A. Macmahon ed. 1955). The modern denotation of the term "federalism" is
the result of the ratification debates over the United States Constitution. Prior to
that debate, political discourse provided only alternative positions: national (con-
solidated) and federal. See THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (J. Madison). It was the rhe-
torical genius of the Federalists to seize the term, branding the Constitution's op-
ponents Anti-Federalists when the latter were in fact the real federalists as that
term had previously been understood. See generally G. WooD, THE CREATION OF
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-87, at 524-32 (1969); Diamond, The Federalist's
View of Federalism, in ESSAYS IN FEDERALISM 20 (1961).
50. This seeming anomaly was a stumbling block for participants in the ratifi-
cation debates. In the Virginia Convention, William Grayson made the problem
explicit:
How are two legislatures to coincide, with powers transcendent, supreme,
and omnipotent? for such is the definition of a legislature. . . . I never
heard of two supreme coordinate powers in one and the same country
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This dual allegiance and dual authority has created continu-
ing difficulties for those attempting to resolve claims of diversity
and nondiversity.5 ' The traditional solution has been to assert
that the Constitution established a set of functional boundaries
corresponding to those powers granted to the national govern-
ment; within the bounds marked out, each sovereign was su-
preme.2 As employed by the Supreme Court, this approach for-
before. I cannot conceive how it can happen. It surpasses every thing that I
have read of concerning other governments, or that I can conceive by the
utmost exertion of my faculties.
3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FED-
ERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADEL-
PHIA IN 1787, at 281 (J. Elliott ed. Philadelphia 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOTT'S DE-
BATES]; see also id. at 29 (statement of George Mason); The Address and Reasons
of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania To Their Constitu-
ents (Dec. 18, 1787), reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 145, 155 (H.
Storing ed. 1981); Letters of Agrippa No. 5 (Dec. 11, 1787), reprinted in 4 id. at
68, 79. Even some supporters of the Constitution had difficulty with the division.
After becoming Vice President, John Adams wrote, "Our government is an at-
tempt to divide a sovereignty; a fresh essay at imperium in imperio. It cannot,
therefore, be expected to be very stable or very firm. It will prevent us for a time
from drawing our swords upon each other, and when it will do that no longer, we
must call a new Convention to reform it." Letter from John Adams to Richard
Price (Apr. 19, 1790), reprinted in 9 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 564, 565 (C.F.
Adams ed. 1854).
51. James Madison, in his letter to Thomas Jefferson providing a copy of the
proposed Constitution, noted that one of the "great objects" was "to draw a line
of demarkation [sic] which would give to the General Government every power
requisite for general purposes, and leave to the States every power which might be
most beneficially administered by them." This partitioning of powers "was per-
haps of all, the most nice and difficult," and Madison feared that the powers of
the national government were insufficient to the task. Letter from James Madison
to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), reprinted in 10 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON 206, 207-09 (R. Rutland ed. 1977).
52. This argument was developed during the debates over the ratification of
the Constitution in response to Anti-Federalist claims that the document was
"calculated ultimately to make the states one consolidated government." Federal
Farmer, Letter No. 1 (Oct. 8, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERAL-
IST 214, 228 (H. Storing ed. 1981). See also Brutus, Letter No. 1 (Oct. 18, 1787),
reprinted in id. at 358, 364-65. In the Virginia ratifying convention, for example,
Edmund Pendleton argued that
[tihe two governments act in different manners, and for different pur-
poses-the general government in great national concerns, in which we are
interested in common with other members of the Union; the state legisla-
ture in our mere local concerns. . . Being for two different purposes, as
long as they are limited to the different objects, they can no more clash
than two parallel lines can meet.
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mally resolved the dual sovereign problem and allowed the Court
to avoid directly confronting the diversity-nondiversity question
by focusing instead upon constitutionally established functional
boundaries.
Unfortunately but understandably, the constitutional text
fails to provide the boundaries this model requires.5" Not only are
there significant areas of concurrent power,"4 but consistent lines
have also proven elusive even where there are nominal bounda-
ries. The textbook example of this difficulty, of course, is the term
"interstate commerce" and the Supreme Court's repeated at-
tempts to formulate tests separating "commerce" from other "ec-
onomic activity" and "interstate" from "intrastate."55 Once eco-
3 ELLIOTT'S DEBATES, supra note 50, at 301 (statement of Edmund Pendleton); see
also 2 id. at 385 (statement of Robert Livingston); 3 id. at 94, 381 (statements of
J. Madison); 4 id. at 160 (statement of William Davie).
53. A conclusion that would not surprise Publius. See THE FEDERALIST No.
37, at 234-35 (J. Madison). For earlier, similar sentiments, see 1 THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 53 (M. Farrand ed. 1911) [hereinafter FED-
ERAL CONVENTION RECORDS] (statement of J. Madison); id. at 60 (statement of J.
Madison).
54. The most apparent is the concurrent power of each government to tax
individuals. U.S. CONST art. I, § 8, cl. 1; § 9, cl. 4; amend. 16.
55. For example, in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189, 194, 196
(1824), Chief Justice Marshall proposed definitional boundaries: "Commerce...
is intercourse." "[A]mong the several states . . . concerns more states than one."
"[T]o regulate ... is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed."
The attempt proved unavailing even for the Marshall Court. E.g., Willson v. Black
Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829) (commerce clause does not
preclude state-authorized dam across navigable stream). Subsequent attempts to
distinguish direct and indirect effects on commerce were similarly unsuccessful.
Compare Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465 (1888) with Seaboard Air Line Ry. v.
Blackwell, 244 U.S. 310 (1917). "[T]he history of judicial limitation of congres-
sional power over commerce . . . has been more largely one of retreat than ulti-
mate victory.' Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 415 (1946). Compare
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) with Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985); compare Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) with United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941);
compare A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)
with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); compare United
States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) with United States v. American To-
bacco Co., 221 U.S. 1106 (1911). See generally O'Fallon, The Commerce Clause: A
Theoretical Comment, 61 OR. L. REV. 395 (1981).
The commerce clause example can be easily reiterated. Thus, the property
clause empowers Congress to "make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting
the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States." U.S. CONST. art.
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nomic reality supplanted the artificial, definitional approach, no
principled line could be drawn between inter- and intrastate com-
merce and the attempt to fashion axiomatic constitutional theo-
ries to resolve the dual sovereignty dilemma collapsed.50
Fortunately, the lack of a coherent theory causes no calami-
tous results. As the Court has increasingly acknowledged, politics
works even in the absence of overarching constitutional theory.
The Court's primary response to the collapse of its theoretical su-
perstructure, therefore, has been an increasing reliance upon the
political process to resolve competing diversity and nondiversity
claims.5 7 As the Court has recognized, this approach finds support
in the structure of the Constitution, which gives the states a ma-
IV, § 3, cl. 2. The Court's decisions on the respective roles of state and federal
governments over federal lands within a state provide a tale that mirrors its com-
merce clause cases. See California Coastal Zone Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 107
S. Ct. 1419 (1987); Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976); Federal Power
Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955); Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343
(1918); Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389 (1917); Fort Leav-
enworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212
(1845); United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526 (1840). See generally Goble,
The Myth of the Classic Property Clause Doctrine, 63 DEN. U.L. REv. 495, 508-11
(1986).
56. E.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
57. The Court does directly confront the diversity/nondiversity issue in those
contexts where state action is attacked as contrary to federal power. For example,
in adjudicating dormant commerce clause cases, the Court explicitly balances the
competing local and national interests:
Where the [state] statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only inci-
dental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate
local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the
extent of the burden that would be tolerated will of course depend on the
nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted
as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (citations omitted). See also
Commonwealth Edison v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981). Less frequently, the
Court relies upon diversity to exempt local activity from federal regulation which
apparently imposed unity requirements. For example, in Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963), Florida avocado producers sought to
enjoin the enforcement of a California statute that determined the maturity of
avocados in a manner which prohibited the sale of some Florida avocados that
were "mature" under federal regulations. The Court explicitly considered the local
diversity claims in upholding that state statute. Id. at 148-49. In both types of
cases, the political branches have the power to override the Court's decisions.
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jor role in the composition and selection of the officers of the fed-
eral government."8 While reliance solely on political safeguards
has its problems, 59 it does provide a more defensible basis from
which to review federalism claims than did the theories which col-
lapsed during the New Deal era.
An abstract invocation of "federalism" says only that a ques-
tion of the relationship between nation and state is present; in
itself, it provides no guidance on how to resolve that issue. De-
spite the failure to fashion a constitutional theory of federalism,
one general principle is undoubted: actions of the federal govern-
ment within the confines of its authority preclude inconsistent
state actions. As a general matter, therefore, a state may not in-
terfere with federal activities or property. This general rule is,
however, subject to an exception that reflects the differing nature
of federalism claims.
B. The Nature of Federalism Claims and the Authority of
the Political Branches
Since the challenge to both statutes is based upon federalism,
it is helpful to note the nature of such claims: the contention that
a governmental action violates a federalism provision of the Con-
stitution ultimately reduces to an assertion that the government
which acted lacked the authority to do so, that it was the "wrong"
government.6 Federalism litigation falls into one of two general
classes: it either questions the validity of federal ac-
tion-contending that the disputed act does not fall within the
scope of any power granted to the national government--or it de-
58. J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 176-90
(1980); Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV.
543, 546 (1954). See also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct.
1005, 1017-20 (1985); THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (J. Madison).
59. See La Pierre, Political Accountability in the National Political Pro-
cess-The Alternative to Judicial Review of Federalism Issues, 80 Nw. U.L. REV.
577 (1986); La Pierre, The Political Safeguards of Federalism Redux: Intergov-
ernmental Immunity and the States as Agents of the Nation, 60 WASH. U.L.Q.
779 (1982); Comment, Garcia, The Seventeenth Amendment, and the Role of the
Supreme Court in Defending Federalism, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'¥ 189 (1987).
60. A federalism challenge concedes that one government has the authority to
take the action in question, merely contending that the government which acted
cannot do so.
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nies the permissibility of state action-asserting that the subject
is within a power to be exercised by the federal government."
Although this dichotomy is self-evident, one conclusion flow-
ing from it deserves emphasis: a judicial decision invalidating na-
tional action on federalism grounds differs fundamentally from a
decision invalidating state action on the same basis. A judgment
that a national government action transgresses a federalism
boundary is the final word; it can be overruled only by a subse-
quent judicial decision or by an amendment to the Constitution.
A finding that state action violates a federalism limit, on the
other hand, is not necessarily the final word because Congress
and the President may overrule the judicial decision simply by
enacting a statute. For example, when the Court decides that
state action is void because the political branches intended to
preempt it, that decision can be reversed simply by amending the
statute to clarify a political decision not to preempt. The same
interplay of judicial and political powers occurs when the Court
decides that the state action violates an unexercised federal
power such as the dormant commerce clause: Congress and the
President may, for example, authorize the states to impose re-
strictions upon interstate commerce which would be constitution-
ally impermissible in the absence of the statute.2 As the Court
61. Although early cases suggested that all interstate commerce was beyond
state regulation, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 209 (1824), since the
Court's decision in Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245
(1829), concurrent federal and state jurisdiction has been the accepted constitu-
tional doctrine. Thus, a federalism challenge to state action requires the chal-
lenger to demonstrate that the subject is exclusively federal. This additional ele-
ment reduces to a question of congressional intent: did Congress intend by its
action or inaction to preempt state activities within the field? See, e.g., Common-
wealth Edison v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
U.S. 137 (1970). This question is not raised by the challenge to either PNEPPCA
or the Gorge Act because the state-appointed compact agencies derive their power
from a waiver of federal supremacy, thus explicitly resolving the question of con-
gressional intent to preempt.
62. Compare United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S.
533 (1944) with Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946) and Western
& S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648 (1981); compare Bow-
man v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 125 U.S. 465 (1888) with Clark Distilling Co. v. West-
ern Maryland Ry., 242 U.S. 311 (1917); compare Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100
(1890) with In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 562 (1891); compare Pennsylvania v.
Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1856) with Pennsylvania
v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518 (1852); see also The
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recently stated in such a case:
It is indeed well settled that Congress may use its power under the
Commerce Clause to '[confer] upon the States an ability to restrict
the flow of interstate commerce that they would not otherwise en-
joy.' . . . The dispositive question . . . is whether Congress has in
fact authorized the states to impose [such] restrictions. 3
Although the question arises most frequently in dormant
commerce clause cases, this is due to the relative frequency of
such decisions rather than to a principled limitation: the author-
ity of Congress and the President to overrule judicial decisions
invalidating state action on federalism grounds extends to all
powers delegated to the national government. For example, Con-
gress and the President may require federal property-managing
agencies to comply with state air and water pollution standards 4
or they may limit the discretion of such agencies by requiring
that facilities constructed on federally-owned lands conform to
state standards. 5 The political branches may require federal
agencies to comply with state-imposed conditions in acquiring
property66 and may empower the states to establish the rules
under which individuals may acquire title to federal lands.
6 7
Thus, as a general matter, the political branches may authorize
state action which would otherwise be constitutionally prohibited
under the implied immunity that is a corollary of the supremacy
clause-and they may do so under any power delegated to the
national government." In effect, the federalism boundaries in
Clinton Bridge, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 454 (1870); see generally O'Fallon, supra note
55, at 404-14; Note, Congressional Consent to Discriminatory State Legislation,
45 COLUM. L. REv. 927, 929-30 (1945); cf. United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286
(1958) (reviewing the history of the various assimilative crimes acts through which
Congress and the President adopted state criminal law for federal enclaves).
63. New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 339-40 (1982)
(quoting Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 44 (1980)).
64. E.g., EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426
U.S. 200, 211 (1976); Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 179 (1976).
65. E.g., Montana v. Johnson, 738 F.2d 1074 (9th Cir. 1984); Citizens & Land-
owners Against the Miles City/New Underwood Power Line v. Secretary of En-
ergy, 683 F.2d 1171, 1178-81 (8th Cir. 1982); Columbia Basin Land Protection
Ass'n v. Schlesinger, 643 F.2d 585, 604-05 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Alabama v.
Seeber, 502 F.2d 1238, 1247-48 (5th Cir. 1974).
66. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
67. Butte City Water Co. v. Baker, 196 U.S. 119 (1905).
68. The fact that the "state" entity is an interstate compact agency does not
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such cases are politically rather than judicially defined."9
The question for the Court in such cases is whether Congress
intended to authorize the otherwise impermissible state action.
Although language seeming to waive supremacy faces a counter-
vailing presumption, the question is one of clarity of the intent
rather than constitutional permissibility:
Because of the fundamental importance of the principles shielding
federal installations and activities from regulation by the States, an
authorization of state regulation is found only when and to the ex-
tent that there is 'a clear congressional mandate,' 'specific congres-
sional action' that makes this authorization of state regulation
'clear and unambiguous.' 70
The question of the authority of the state-appointed compact
agencies to restrict the discretion of the federal property manag-
ers turns upon the clarity of the congressional intent to grant the
authority. This is a question of statutory language rather than
constitutional text.
change the fundamental principle. While compacts most frequently transfer state
powers to the federal government-the practical effect of giving the federal courts
jurisdiction to decide issues arising under the terms of the compact, see supra
note 15-compacts can also transfer federal powers to the compacting states. For
example, the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act authorizes the creation of
regional interstate compacts to provide for the disposal of low-level radioactive
wastes. The Act allows the compacting states to prohibit the importation of wastes
"generated outside of the region comprised of the party states." Low-Level Radio-
active Waste Policy Amendments Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2021d & note (1986). In the
absence of this authorization, it would be an unconstitutional burden on the inter-
state commerce in garbage for any state to prohibit the importation of waste. See
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (garbage is an item of commerce
and a state may not prohibit its importation); Washington State Bldg. Trades
Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913
(1983) (state statute prohibiting importation of radioactive wastes is unconstitu-
tional under the commerce and supremacy clauses).
69. As Dean Choper has noted, in exercising this type of judicial review, the
Court "acts only as an intermediate agency between the states and Congress"; it
"performs an essentially legislative role, quite nakedly constructing policies for the
particular case that are the product of the Court's own value-balancing of national
versus state concerns." J. CHoPER, supra note 58, at 207.
70. Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 179 (1976) (footnotes omitted). See also
New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 339-40 (1982); Lewis v.
BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 44 (1980); California v. United States,
438 U.S. 645, 665-66 (1978); EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Con-
trol Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 211 (1976).
1987]
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
C. The Statutes: Of Master Builders and the Gorge
The contention that it is impermissible to authorize state-ap-
pointed officers to exercise policymaking authority over federal
officials was litigated in a case challenging part of the regional
conservation and power plan developed under PNEPPCA by the
Power Planning Council." The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected this argument, holding that the Council was constitu-
tional; the decision provides strong precedent for concluding that
the Columbia River Gorge Commission is also constitutionally
permissible.
The suit was brought by a homebuilders association dis-
pleased with the changes in housing construction required under
the Council's plan. Among the arguments offered was the conten-
tion that the statute violated federalism limitations by subjecting
the decisions of a federal agency to a state-appointed body.72 The
Department of Justice intervened in the suit, contending that, al-
though the specific powers exercised by the Council at issue in
the case presented no problems, other provisions of PNEPPCA
did raise "difficult" constitutional issues; the Department urged
the court to avoid the constitutional issue.73
71. Seattle Master Builders Ass'n v. Pacific Northwest Elec. Power & Conser-
vation Planning Council, 786 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
939 (1987). The suit attacked the validity of the Model Conservation Standards,
the regional energy-conserving building standards that are a federally mandated
component of the regional power plan.
72. In addition to procedural and substantive challenges to the plan itself,
petitioners argued that the statute was unconstitutional on alternative separation
of powers and federalism grounds. Petitioners first contended that the Council
violated separation of powers principles because it exercised powers that only a
federal agency could wield; thus, it was not a true interstate compact-and its inem-
bers could only be appointed in compliance with the provisions of the appoint-
ments clause of the federal Constitution. See Master Builders, 786 F.2d at 1371-
78 (Beezer, J., dissenting); Brief of Amicus Curiae Pacific Legal Foundation at 23-
33, id.; Petitioners' Reply Brief at 27-29, id. Alternatively, petitioners argued that
PNEPPCA violated federalism limitations by subjecting the decisions of a federal
agency to a state-appointed body. Petitioners' Opening Brief at 53-55, id.; Peti-
tioners' Reply Brief at 21-25, id.
73. Brief for the United States as Intervenor at 13, id. In demonstrating the
difficulty of the issues in support of its argument that the Court should avoid the
issue, the Department contended that the Council's federalism argument was un-
tenable because the Council exercised significant power in some areas over a fed-
eral agency under a federal statute, a power that the agency thought problematic.
Id. at 18-19. It also noted, however, that the Council might exercise such powers if
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The Ninth Circuit declined the Department's request to rule
narrowly, concluding that the authority to exercise power over a
federal agency was unquestionable:
There is no bar against federal agencies following policies set by
nonfederal agencies. The federal government has in fact agreed to
be bound by state law in several areas. The federal government can
be subject to state law where there is a clear congressional mandate
and specific legislation which makes the authorization of state con-
trol clear and unambiguous.7"
The court held that the Council was a constitutionally permissi-
ble example of "an innovative system of cooperative federalism
under which the states, within limits provided in the Act, can re-
present their shared interests in the maintenance and develop-
ment of a power supply in the Pacific Northwest and in related
environmental concerns.""
The Master Builders decision enunciates the proper standard
for reviewing the executive branch's challenge to the Gorge Act.
As with the attack on PNEPPCA, the issue is whether "there is a
clear congressional mandate and specific legislation which makes
the authorization of state control clear and unambiguous."" The
Gorge Act and its legislative history demonstrate congressional
intent with the requisite clarity.
"its members may be viewed as officers of the state ... despite the significant
federal authority they exercise." Id. at 20. Given this ambiguity and that the De-
partment felt that the issue was unnecessary to a decision in the particular, it
urged the court not to rule on the constitutional issues. Id. at 23-29.
74. Master Builders, 786 F.2d at 1364 (citations omitted).
75. Id. at 1366. The dissent would have decided the case on separation of
powers grounds, concluding that "Congress has usurped the constitutionally dele-
gated power of the executive branch by authorizing state governors to appoint the
members of the Council." Id. at 1378 (Beezer, J., dissenting). It reached this con-
clusion by arguing that, because the Council "has a federal purpose and receives
its authority from federal law, the Council is a federal agency." Id. at 1373. As
such, it was unconstitutional because its members were not appointed in compli-
ance with the appointments clause. Id. at 1374. The dissent dismissed the federal-
ism question, noting simply that the "members of the Council exercise significant
authority pursuant to federal law. As a result, the system of federalism embodied
in the Constitution gives the power to select Council members to the executive
branch." Id. at 1377. The majority and the dissent thus failed even to agree on the
correct characterization of the issue: does the Council raise separation of powers
or federalism questions? See generally Goble, supra note 15, at 60-64.
76. Master Builders, 786 F.2d at 1364.
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The challenge to the constitutionality of the Gorge Act is
predicated upon the provision that allows the compact agency to
"disapprove" the Secretary of Agriculture's decision to condemn
land within the scenic area before the management plan for the
area has been completed. 77 The Secretary's "extremely lim-
ited"7 -or "broad, new"S7 -condemnation authority was a very
controversial feature of the legislation"0 and the restriction on the
Secretary's authority was one element that the bill's supporters
cited as fostering local control.81 They did so in terms that leave
no doubt as to the proper interpretation of the statutory term
"disapprove." Representative Weaver, the manager of the bill in
the House, stated that "any proposed condemnation . . . by the
Secretary can be overriden [sic] by . ..the commission. 8.. Rep-
resentative Morrison argued that one of the features of the legis-
lation related to local control was the fact that "[a] two-thirds
majority of the bi-State Commission, or the Governor of the State
involved, can override a condemnation decision."83 The oppo-
nents of the bill conceded this interpretation, acknowledging that
"[t]here is a proviso in this bill that will allow an override of any
condemnation by the Federal Government by the Commission."8"
The Gorge Act's language and legislative history both demon-
77. The proviso provides in full:
[W]ithin thirty days of the filing by the Secretary of a complaint for con-
demnation of any land or interest in the scenic area, outside of the special
management areas and urban areas, the Commission, by a vote of two-
thirds of its membership including a majority of the members appointed
from each State, or if the Commission is not in existence the Governor of
the State in which the land or interest is located, may disapprove such pro-
posed complaint.
Gorge Act, § 10(b)(1), 16 U.S.C.A. § 544h(b)(1) (West Supp. 1987).
78. 132 CONG. REc. H10,485 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1986) (statement of Rep.
Weaver). The proviso was originally included in the bill by the House. See id. at
H11,131. The House bill was subsequently adopted by the Senate without any
discussion of the proviso. See id. at S16,877-79 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986). Thus, the
only legislative history is to be found in the House debates.
79. Id. at H10,486 (statement of Rep. Robert F. Smith).
80. See generally id. at H10,489 (statement of Rep. Lagomarsino); id. at
H11,123 (statement of Rep. Morrison); id. at H11,124 (statement of Rep. Strang);
id. (statement of Rep. Robert F. Smith).
81. E.g., id. at H10,485 (statement of Rep. Weaver); id. at H11,123-24 (state-
ment of Rep. Morrison).
82. Id. at H10,484 (statement of Rep. Weaver).
83. Id. at H11,123 (statement of Rep. Morrison).
84. Id. at H11,143 (statement of Rep. Robert F. Smith).
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strate the required clear congressional intent to waive federal
supremacy.
The executive branch's challenge to the constitutionality of
the Gorge Act is without basis.8 5 There are no federalism-based
restrictions on congressional waivers of supremacy. If the political
branches decide to allow states to restrict federal activities or the
uses of federal property, they may do so. The legal requirements
imposed by the Court are intended simply to ensure that the
waiver was actually a considered conclusion. Thus, if the waiver is
unambiguous, the Court's work is at an end. In both PNEPPCA
and the Gorge Act, the intent to waive national supremacy was
clearly expressed.
IV. CONCLUSION
The founding documents of the United States reflect the rec-
ognition that government, while necessary to protect fundamental
values-life, liberty, property, equality"-may become destruc-
tive of the values it is instituted to promote.8 7 With their
Newtonian perspective,"8 the founders viewed this dilemma
85. Which suggests that the principal reason for withholding the Justice De-
partment's legal opinion on the matter may be to avoid embarrassment rather
than to protect state secrets. See supra note 43.
86. Thus, the Declaration of Independence begins with the assertion that it is
a "self-evident" truth that "governments are instituted among men" to secure
"certain unalienable rights" including "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."
The Declaration of Independence para. 1 (U.S. 1776). Similarly, the Constitution
was established "to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic
Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and
secure the Blessings of Liberty." U.S. CONST. preamble.
87. As the Declaration of Independence notes, governments can become "de-
structive of these ends." The Declaration of Independence para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
Publius noted this tension in THE FEDERALIST:
Energy in Government is essential to that security against external and in-
ternal danger, and to that prompt and salutary execution of the laws, which
enter into the very definition of good Government. Stability in Govern-
ment, is essential to national character, and to the advantages annexed to
it, as well as to that repose and confidence in the minds of the people,
which are among the chief blessings of civil society. . . . On comparing,
however, these valuable ingredients with the vital principles of liberty, we
must perceive at once, the difficulty of mingling them together in their due
proportions.
THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 233-34 (J. Madison).
88. Sir Isaac Newton's work provided the dominant intellectual paradigm of
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largely as a problem of fashioning a machine that would effi-
ciently promote the ends of government while checking the tyran-
nical impulses of its operators.8 9 They sought to preserve the lib-
ertarian goals of the Revolution and to remedy the perceived
failures of the Confederation by restructuring the procedure
through which political power would be exercised. They also
sought to create a more "energetic" government while minimizing
its abusive potential by restricting the field of its operation. To
meet these twin goals of efficiency s° and liberty,91 they doubly di-
the eighteenth century. C. BECKER, THE HEAVENLY CITY OF' THE EIGHTEENTH-CEN-
TURY PHILOSOPHERS 54-63 (1932). The machine, with its precisely balanced clock-
work forces, was a frequent metaphor. Jefferson, for example, wrote of "the great
machine of government." T. JEFFERSON, A Summary View of the Rights of British
America (1774), in 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 121, 121 (J. Boyd ed.
1950); see also 2 FEDERAL CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 53, at 278; THE FED-
ERALIST No. 19, at 121 (J. Madison); id. No. 58, at 396 (J. Madison); id. No. 65, at
443 (A. Hamilton); id. No. 69, at 467 (A. Hamilton). As Woodrow Wilson was to
note at the beginning of this century,
the Constitution of the United States [was] made under the dominion of
the Newtonian Theory. You have only to read the papers of The Federalist
to see that fact written on every page. They speak of the 'checks and bal-
ances' of the Constitution, and use to express their idea the simile of the
organization of the universe, and particularly the solar system,-how by the
attraction of gravitation the various parts are held in their orbits; and then
they proceed to represent Congress, the Judiciary, and the President as a
sort of imitation of the solar system.
W. WILSON, THE NEW FREEDOM 45-46 (1914). Wilson revealed his intellectual
model: "The trouble with the theory is that government is not a machine, but a
living thing. It falls, not under the theory of the universe, but. under the theory of
organic life. It is accountable to Darwin, not to Newton." Id. at 47.
89. Gordon Wood has argued that the fundamental distinction between the
Federalists and the Anti-Federalists was the distinction "between those [the Anti-
Federalists] who clung to moral reform and the regeneration of men's hearts as
the remedy for viciousness and those [the Federalists] who looked to mechanical
devices and institutional contrivances as the only lasting solution for America's
ills." G. WOOD, supra note 49, at 428 (1969). See also H. Storing, What the Anti-
Federalists Were For, 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 1, 15-23 (H. Storing ed.
1981). Thus, the dilemma, as Publius put it, was to find "a Republican remedy for
the diseases most incident to Republican Government." THE: FEDERALIST No. 10,
at 65 (J. Madison).
90. The efficiency rationale for federalism was stated by Madison at the Fed-
eral Convention:
The great objection made agst. an abolition of the State Govts. was that the
Genl. Govt. could not extend its care to all the minute objects which fall
under the cognizance of the local jurisdictions. The objection as stated lay
not agst. the probable abuse of the general power, but agst. the imperfect
use that could be made of it throughout so great an extent of country, and
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vided political power, incorporating a spatial and functional divi-
sion-a distribution of power between the federal and state gov-
ernments, on the one hand, and among the trinity of legislative,
executive, and judicial branches, on the other.2
In rejecting the Confederation's national-state relations, the
founders were concerned principally with restructuring the gov-
ernment so that it would be sufficient to achieve continental
over so great a variety of objects.
1 FEDERAL CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 53, at 357. As Jefferson more suc-
cinctly put it: "Were we directed from Washington when to sow, and when to
reap, we should soon want bread." T. JEFFERSON, Autobiography (1821), in 1 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 1, 122 (Monticello ed. 1903). See also Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in 15 id. at 32, 37-38.
The need for an energetic and efficient government was a common refrain
during the debates on the proposed constitution. For example, in THE FEDERALIST
No. 23, Publius addressed the need to adopt a constitution "at least equally ener-
getic with the one proposed," relying upon the "[d]efective" nature of the Articles
of Confederation. THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 146, 148 (A. Hamilton). The argu-
ment was frequently reiterated. See id. No. 15, at 93 (A. Hamilton); id. No. 22, at
140 (A. Hamilton); id. No. 26, at 164-65 (A. Hamilton); id. No. 37, at 231, 233-34
(J. Madison). See also Adams, Thoughts on Government (1776), in 1 AMERICAN
POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA 1760-1805, at 401, 404 (C. Hyne-
man & D. Lutz eds. 1983); letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec.
16, 1786), reprinted in 10 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 602, 603 (J. Boyd ed.
1954); letter from John Jay to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 18, 1786), reprinted in 10
id. at 272-72; letter from John Jay to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 9, 1787), reprinted
in 11 id. at 129. Many Anti-Federalists conceded the need for a more "efficient
and energetic" government. See, e.g., E. Gerry, Objections to Signing the Na-
tional Constitution (1787), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 4, 7 (H. Storing
ed. 1981); An Old Whig (1787), in 3 id. at 17, 30; A Plebeian (1788), in 6 id. at
128, 134-35. See generally GOODNOW, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT
18-19 (1916); Maass, Division of Powers: An Areal Analysis, in AREA AND POWER
9, 9-10 (A. Maass ed. 1959); Ylvisaker, Some Criteria for a "Proper" Areal Divi-
sion of Governmental Powers, id. at 27, 30-33.
91. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 351-53 (J. Madison). The libertarian goal
has frequently been presumed the sole or at least dominant object of the division
of political power. See also Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 137 (1959); Huffman,
Governing America's Resources: Federalism in the 1980's, 12 ENVTL. L. 863
(1982).
92. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the
people, is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the
portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separated de-
partments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people.
The different governments will controul [sic] each other; at the same
time that each will be controuled [sic] by itself.
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 351 (J. Madison).
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ends.93 They sought to fashion a remedy for the diseases of feder-
alism-as the term was then understood-by constituting an en-
tirely new structure that was, "in strictness neither a national nor
a federal constitution; but a composition of both. '9 4 Their remedy
has clearly failed if the structure they established is so inflexible
that the national and state governments-which between them
93. Professor Huffman has argued that federalism can be justified only to the
extent that it promotes "the autonomy and welfare of the individual," which he
equates with freedom "from the constraints imposed by government or their fel-
low citizens." Huffman, supra note 91, at 867 n.18. He thus emphasizes the liber-
tarian rationale of federalism to the exclusion of the efficiency rationale. His equa-
tion of federalism with individual autonomy is questionable on at least three
grounds.
First, Professor Huffman's assertion is historically inaccurate. The founders
did not believe that the sole or even dominant end of federalism was individual
autonomy. The creation of an energetic and efficient government was a more im-
portant goal in structuring the relationship between state and national govern-
ments; the point, after all, was to replace a failed confederacy with a national
government sufficiently energetic to accomplish its proper ends. As Madison ar-
gued, "Were it practicable for the Genl. Govt. to extend its care to every requisite
object without -the cooperation of the State Govts. the people would not be less
free as members of one great Republic than as members of thirteen small ones." 1
FEDERAL CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 53, at 357. This drive for an efficient
government was informed by a republican ideology which insisted that there was a
public good that was more than the sum of individual greed: Publius was not a
Reaganaut; greed was to be controlled rather than extolled. See THE FEDERALIST
No. 10 (J. Madison); id. No. 31 (A. Hamilton); see generally G. WooD, supra note
49, at 471-518.
Second, the equation of federalism with individual autonomy lacks any logical
basis. "Federalism" is shorthand for the allocation of power between state and
national governments. It is an allocation of power between governments rather
than a denial of power to government. See supra note 60. The "liberty" that fed-
eralism preserves is not freedom from all governmental constraints, but rather the
freedom to have some constraints imposed only by one government or the other.
The equation rests upon an unstated premise about the relative intrusiveness of
state and national regulation-a premise which is at least historically
questionable.
Finally, Professor Huffman's view of autonomous individuals free of the con-
straints of their fellow citizens is but another artificial fence that recreates the
transboundary problems at the interpersonal level. Like jurisdictional boundaries,
his view denies the essential interconnectedness of individuals that defines society.
This does not mean that individuals are simply cogs in some anthill state. It
is instead a recognition that your decision to play loud music affects my opportu-
nity to sleep, and that I therefore have a legitimate claim to protest. Whether I
may restrict your conduct so that I can sleep will depend upon several things-but
it will not depend upon federalism.
94. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 257 (J. Madison).
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are the repositories of the full measure of political
power"9-cannot adjust their respective spheres of responsibility
in accordance with political need.
To insist on such rigidity based on an overarching constitu-
tional theory that demands clear lines between nation and state is
like Frost's fellow wall mender:
He only says, 'Good fences make good neighbors.'
Spring is the mischief in me, and I wonder
If I could put a notion in his head:
'Why do they make good neighbors? . . .
Something there is that doesn't love a wall,
That wants it down.'"
To insist upon the sanctity of walls that serve only to frus-
trate a more comprehensive response to a problem inherent in the
federal structure itself is to be unfaithful to the ingenious ma-
chine the founders constructed.
95. There is no suggestion that any individual's constitutionally-protected
rights are at stake-an unremarkable conclusion when it is remembered that a
federalism claim does not in itself implicate any individual rights since such
claims amount to the assertion that the wrong government is acting. Although an
individual may have a protected interest that is affected by the challenged con-
duct, the interest is not a federalism concern.
96. R. Frost, Mending Wall, supra note 2, at 33-34. The "Something there is"
is nature "That sends the frozen-ground-swell under it, And spills the upper boul-
ders in the sun." Id.
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